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Collective beliefs for responsible investment 
 
 
CHRISTEL DUMAS; ICHEC Brussels Management School 





The financial community does not seem to have shifted yet to greater sustainability, despite 
increasing awareness and concerns around social and environmental issues. In this paper, we 
provide insights to help understand why. Building on responsible investment (RI) data from 
the UK financial press between 1982 and 2010, we examine the collective beliefs which 
financial actors rely on to take decisions under uncertainty, as a way of understanding the 
status of and implications for RI mainstreaming.  
  
Our results identify five periods that characterize RI over time. The “civil rights” years (1982-
1991), the “green niche” years (1992-1997), the “professionalization” years (1998-2000), the 
“SRI” years (2001-2004) and the “ESG” years (2005-ongoing) follow each other with specific 
representations and practices for RI.  The analysis of the collective beliefs leads us to define 
two theoretical dimensions – justifying RI and practicing RI—that allow us to characterize 
how mainstream actors collectively make sense of RI. Our data confirm the existence of 
collective beliefs around RI and highlights changes in the content of the collective beliefs 
throughout the five periods, demonstrating a dynamic in the RI field. Our analysis reveals that 
the RI collective beliefs currently (1) do not provide a favorable environment for RI 
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While many signs show that responsible investment (RI) has gained importance in capital 
markets (Mercer, 2009; Mercer & UNEP FI, 2007), there has not been a significant global 
shift towards greater sustainability in finance. One potential reason for this paradoxical 
situation is the inconclusive debates on the performance of RI (Margolis, 2009), despite more 
than 200 academic articles addressing sustainability’s financial performance (e.g., Derwall, 
Guenster, Bauer, & Koedijk, 2005; Bauer, Derwall, & Otten, 2007), including several meta-
studies (Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes, 2003; Allouche & Laroche, 2005; Wu, 2006). 
 
In this paper we propose another reason for this paradox, which we explore through a new 
theoretical lens. Building on the concept of collective beliefs (Orlean, 2004, 2006; Bourghelle 
2005; Dequech, 2005), we argue that RI mainstreaming, i.e. the integration of environmental, 
social and governance (ESG) issues into mainstream finance (Kurtz, 2008), is unlikely to 
happen as long as it is not supported by the collective beliefs, which are shared interpretations 
that guide investors’ actions and decisions (Jemel-Fornetty, Louche, & Bourghelle, 2011). We 
argue that the understanding of the collective beliefs around the activity of responsible 
investment can provide insights on equity market participants' decision making. The 
collective beliefs thereby inform the debate on sustainable development and financial 
markets.  
  
To support this proposition, we ask two questions: What are the collective beliefs for 
responsible investment and how have they evolved over time. Three areas of investigation 
flow from these research questions. We first want to identify the collective beliefs of RI in 
mainstream finance. Second, we address the evolution of the collective beliefs over time. 
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Third, we discuss the implication of those collective beliefs for mainstreaming and RI in 
general. 
  
The analysis of the collective beliefs is based on the RI media coverage in the UK financial 
press between 1985 and 2010. During this period, we identified 3,462 articles to which we 
applied a bracketing method (Langley, 1999) in order to decompose the history of responsible 
investment into successive RI periods. We then performed an in-depth content analysis of the 
press articles for a sub-sample of 89 articles. 
 
Our data show that five periods characterized the evolution of RI. Those periods are each 
marked with a very specific terminology and focus. It highlights the dynamism of the field but 
also the fact that RI is still in a process of institutionalization. The analysis has allowed us to 
identify collective beliefs around RI and revealed that the collective beliefs are not stable yet. 
The collective beliefs identified in our study can be classified in three main areas– ‘what is 
RI’, ‘why do RI’ and ‘how to do RI’. The content of the collective beliefs highlight the 
complexity of RI and tensions linked to RI mainstreaming. 
  
We primarily contribute to the literature on RI mainstreaming. Although mainstreaming has 
been widely discussed, very few studies, if any, have tried to theorize this phenomenon. We 
first provide a longitudinal study of RI supported with empirical data. Second, we focus on 
the meso-level, between the individual actors and the institutional level, by considering 
collective beliefs. And third we provide insights into the capacity of RI to become 
mainstream. 
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Furthermore, our research on RI provides a new area of study for convention theory. Most 
importantly, we offer an empirical exploration of collective beliefs as well as a method to 
examine collective beliefs. Most of the studies on collective beliefs are indeed either 
conceptual or remain rather vague on how to empirically examine collective beliefs.  
 
Finally our study contributes to theory development by refining the notion of collective 
beliefs. We identify two types of collective beliefs – justifying RI and practicing RI – and 
show that justification and action coexist and interact. Our paper therefore participates in an 
ongoing conversation about how institutions influence our thoughts and behavior. 
  
This paper is organized as follows. The first part outlines the theoretical framework and the 
context of RI mainstreaming. The second part presents the research design, data and methods 
used in the study. The third part provides the analysis and findings with a focus first on the RI 
periods, then on the collective beliefs. The results are discussed in the fourth and last part, 
including their implications and ideas for further research in the area of RI mainstreaming. 
 
COLLECTIVE BELIEFS AND RI MAINSTREAMING 
Collective beliefs 
The concept of belief is not common in economics and finance (Orléan, 2006). The financial 
system is largely based on economic analysis and neo-classical financial theory that both give 
great importance to quantitative measures. However, by disregarding the beliefs and social 
context in which these numbers are produced, standard theories fail to explain anomalies such 
as speculative bubbles, confidence crises, excessive volatility, not the least of which is the 
latest financial crisis. They also fail to consider important dimensions of value (Orléan, 2011). 
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Value is a representation constructed by a group (Orléan, 2011; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). 
This is true for religious value or aesthetic value but also for economic value, which neo-
classical economics does not recognize. Even if economic value distinguishes itself from 
others because it is represented by a price, it still is largely a social construction.  
 
A well-documented illustration of collective beliefs is the social construction of price by the 
Black–Scholes–Merton options pricing formula. It gained exponential success in the 1970s 
among option traders, regardless of its accuracy in calculating option prices and of traders’ 
personal belief in the accuracy of the model. Economic actors used this model to coordinate 
their actions under uncertainty, based on the collective belief that a majority of other 
economic actors used the model, with the unintended consequence of changing patterns of 
prices in the option market (Beunza, Hardie, & MacKenzie, 2006; MacKenzie, 2006 ; Millo 
& MacKenzie, 2009).  
 
A collective belief is a shared interpretation of the future evolution of financial markets, and 
plays a central role in Orléan’s research (2004). He defines collective beliefs as follows:  
“An individual I believes that the group G believes the proposition P if he believes that, 
in the majority, the members of the group G believe that the group G believes P” 
(Orléan, 2006, p.171).  
A collective belief can therefore be disconnected from what individual agents believe: this is 
its self-referential nature. As a result, the market has its own autonomous belief, which is not 
the sum of individual beliefs. This becomes evident when investors make decisions based on 
their anticipation of the future behavior of “the market”, and when we observe discourse such 
as “the market believes bonds are over-priced” or “the market does not believe the Federal 
Reserve’s announcements”. Under uncertainty, collective beliefs will help investors to make 
decisions, thereby influencing economic value and the adoption of new practices.  




A number of empirical papers have explored how financial market participants coordinate 
their actions based on collective beliefs (Table 1). Bourghelle et al. (2011) and Guyatt (2006) 
address more specifically the case of RI mainstreaming, both suggesting that collective beliefs 
constitute impediments to mainstreaming. The former discusses this thesis theoretically, but is 
not backed up by empirical data. And though the latter refers to collective beliefs, these 
notions are presented in a behavioral finance perspective rather than according to Orléan’s 
framework.  
--- Insert table 1 here --- 
During a period of instability, coordination based on collective beliefs increases stability. 
Everyone considers the same references, which reinforces their legitimacy. But since this 
coordination is based on beliefs and choices which could have been different, it is regularly 
challenged and may be put in peril. The studies therefore illustrate the content of collective 
beliefs and how they influence financial markets, but do not give much insight on how these 
conventions were formed or how they evolved. However, Bourghelle (2005) notes that since 
financial actors all read the same press and listen to the same experts, the financial press is an 
essential mediator in the formation of collective beliefs.  
 
The concept of collective belief is part of a theory, convention theory, which was developed 
by a group of economists and sociologists (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; Boltanski & 
Chiapello, 2005; Dupuy, Favereau, Orléan, Salais, & Thévenot, 1989). Together they propose 
an enlarged model of rationality which becomes embedded in questions of coordination and 
values. Convention theory focuses on analyzing cognitive interactions and the multiplicity of 
equilibriums using discourse and conventions. Within this group of theorists, authors like 
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Orléan, Bourghelle, and Dequech focus more specifically on understanding economic value in 
financial markets and highlight the self-referential nature of collective beliefs. 
 
This self-referential approach is the one that we adopt in studying collective beliefs in RI 
mainstreaming. There is no scientific basis to determine the mathematical expectations 
(probabilities) of the impact of ESG factors on the return of an investment. In this sense, 
expectations in the future of an asset’s performance have a subjective component. They are 
informed opinions (which is indeed what ESG rating agencies say they deliver). Consider the 
following example: an individual fund manager believes a majority of other fund managers 
believe the market considers environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria as non-
material. This does not result from the fund manager’s personal view on RI, or from other 
market players’ personal views, but it will influence their investment decision. We argue in 
this article that collective beliefs play an important role in mainstreaming a new activity in 
financial markets. They can either support or hinder it depending on their content.  
 
Responsible Investment mainstreaming 
Although the definition of RI is the object of ongoing debate (Sandberg et al., 2009; Dahlsrud, 
2008), scholars often agree that RI refers to the  “integration of social, ethical, environmental 
and/or corporate governance concerns in the investment process” (Sandberg et al., 2009).   
However, both practitioners and the media use varied terminology when speaking about SRI. 
Non-exhaustive lists include “ethical investment”, “green funds”, “socially responsible 
investment”, “sustainable investment” and “ESG investing” (Sandberg et al. 2009). This 
variety in terms points to a high heterogeneity which has developed throughout the history of 
RI (Sparkes & Cowton, 2004; Louche & Lydenberg, 2010).  
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Practicing RI is neither easy nor unproblematic, because the heterogeneity of RI is not limited 
to its definition (Sandberg et al. 2009). The varied terminology goes along with a variety of 
investment strategies and practices (Entine, 2003)  ranging from exclusion based on screens, 
to shareholder engagement with companies, to selecting investments with a focus on having a 
community impact (Louche & Lydenberg, 2011).  
 
RI mainstreaming is proclaimed by many RI practitioners (World Economic Forum and 
AccountAbility, 2005; Robeco and Booz & Company, 2008) and has become a central 
question in the RI research arena (Lydenberg, 2009). But there is an implicit assumption 
within the field, in both academic and business communities, that everybody knows what 
mainstreaming is about, so it has never been quite defined. Mainstreaming of RI is sometimes 
considered as the maturation of RI (Sparkes and Cowton, 2004). Lydenberg (2009) mentions 
the notion of professionalization, or even the notion of progress. These claims to RI 
mainstreaming recognize the evolution of the RI market in two directions: growth of assets 
under management and new investor categories. Mainstreaming is about the adoption or the 
practice of RI by major investors, consisting of the most important ownership groups of 
quoted companies, mostly represented by pension funds and insurance companies (Sparkes 
2002, McCann et al 2003) and referred to as institutional investors. Another element that we 
find in the literature on RI mainstreaming is the notion of RI spreading to every financial 
investment product category (Strandberg, 2005; Lydenberg 2009). Amaeshi et al (2010) argue 
that RI mainstreaming implies a fit between RI and the dominant financial market logic of 
calculation and singularization  for profit, putting high emphasis on the financial performance 
of RI: “for the RI market to be mainstreamed, it has to be amenable to the mainstream 
financial market demands of objectivation and singularization ” (Amaeshi 2010, p.52). All 
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those factors lead us to say that RI mainstreaming means the integration of social, 
environmental and governance issues into conventional finance.  
 
Following these claims to mainstreaming, recent scholarship has focused on the impediments 
to mainstreaming. Various impediments to mainstreaming have been highlighted in literature, 
including at the institutional level, the organizational level and the individual level. These 
include, but are not limited to, opposing logics, lack of adequate products and tools, and lack 
of evidence of effectiveness in terms of social return (Amaeshi, 2010; Guyatt, 2006; Juravle 
and Lewis, 2008). Juravle and Lewis (2008, p. 287) state that “these views act almost as 
social paradigms within the finance community, facilitating or impeding the mainstreaming” 
of RI.  
  
A second type of impediment is the undemonstrated economic value of RI. This debate is 
important to legitimize ESG on the economic grounds that prevail in the business world and 
financial market (Amaeshi, 2010). The question has been addressed from a management 
perspective (are executives taking money that would otherwise go to the firm’s owners?) and 
from an investor perspective (are investments in RI underperforming, putting it in 
contradiction with fiduciary duty?). A few meta-analyses of these studies give an idea of the 
importance of this research topic: Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes (2003) analyzed 52 studies, 
Allouche and Laroche (2005) analyzed 82, Wu (2006) analyzed 39 and Margolis et al. 
analyzed 251 studies (2009). According to Margolis et al.’s meta-analysis, “after thirty-five 
years of research, the preponderance of evidence indicates a mildly positive relationship 
between corporate social performance and corporate financial performance”, a result which 
neither satisfied the proponents of SRI nor its detractors.  
 
Some authors state that the results are inconclusive because the question was not correctly 
addressed. They criticize “several important theoretical and empirical limitations” 
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(McWilliams and Siegel, 2000), such as the sample size, insufficient historical data covering a 
short time span, aggregation of E(nvironmental), S(ocial) and G(overnance) issues which 
should be considered separately (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Margolis et al., 2009). A more 
recent type of criticism, made by Orlitzky (2013) and Vogel (2005), is epistemological: 
financial markets are not efficient, financial actors are not rational, and there is no such thing 
as an intrinsic value which the market supposedly reveals. In that context, determining the 
value, and legitimacy, of sustainability may require looking away from neo-classical theories 
and financial return. With such views, this scholarship also challenges the dominant, 
simplified view of markets as fully efficient, transparent, and rational.   
 
Together, these studies reinforce the importance of understanding a financial activity in terms 
of discourse, representations, and social context. The point to be made here is that another 
perspective is needed to address how ESG signals affect financial markets and to understand 
how we collectively make sense of RI and its value. The approach we detail below links RI 
mainstreaming to collective beliefs, as crystalized in the financial press.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA AND METHODS 
Media as a proxy for collective beliefs 
To research the concept of collective beliefs and to study their evolution in an emerging field 
with high uncertainty, we focus on the media coverage of RI in the financial press over time. 
Barkemeyer et al. (2010, p.382) suggest that “whilst it cannot be proven that there is a direct 
correlation between coverage of a specific event and change in behavior, there is no doubt 
that media coverage can influence the level of awareness of specific issues and could act as a 
general barometer of the contextual framing of issues such as business ethics, sustainable 
development, corporate citizenship, and accountability within society.”  
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There is a tradition of CSR studies as well as of finance studies using data from the media. 
Many authors are currently investigating the role and influence of the media in financial 
markets either in terms of the influence of media on companies’ CSR (Baron, 2005; Dyck, 
Volchkova, & Zingales, 2008; Zyglidopoulos, Carroll, Georgiadis, & Siegel, 2010), or in 
terms of the influence of media on share prices (Fang & Peress, 2008; Palomino, Renneboog, 
& Zhang, 2009; Tetlock, 2007). We build on these studies to consider media as valid proxy 
for collective beliefs. However, the study of RI through media coverage is new to our 
knowledge.  
 
Data sampling and analysis  
The data we present come from the UK financial press and was selected in several stages. 
Table 2 outlines both stages of the research, with their respective sampling and analysis. 
--- Insert table 2 here --- 
We compiled articles by searching Factiva, a Dow Jones news database encompassing more 
than 28,000 sources1. We identified journals based on prior studies, limiting our search to the 
Financial Times, the Wall Street Journal Europe and The Economist, which all generally 
correlate closely with other sources of financial information such as Bloomberg, as suggested 
by Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) and confirmed by Dyck et al. (2008). The press articles 
provided non-sensitive, publicly available material, from which the researchers were 
independent.  
 
Stage 1: Determining the RI periods  
Sampling. We first constructed a large sample of all UK press articles addressing RI, using 
key word searches. The first set of keywords, selected based on their appearance and 
                                                          
1On Factiva’s content, see http://factiva.com/sources/contentwatch.asp?node=menuElem1522 
(accessed July 12, 2010). The data was collected in July 2010. 
Dumas & Louche, Collective beliefs for responsible investment; 2015 
12 
 
frequency in RI academic literature, included: “responsible investment”, “ESG”, “sustainable 
investment” and “ethical investment”. We completed the first set of articles with an iterative 
snowball process (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), using the names of key RI actors over time for 
new searches. EIRIS, FTSE and UN PRI are some examples of such names. The process was 
reiterated until searches using the names of field actors led to no new relevant articles: the 
saturation point. At the end of the first round of data collection, we had 3,982 articles on RI 
published between 1982 and 2010, as illustrated in Figure 1. The first articles we found in the 
database were published in March 1982.  
--- Insert figure 1 here --- 
 
Analysis. In this first stage of analysis we used a bracketing method (Langley, 1999) for its 
descriptive utility in a longitudinal analysis, but also as a structuring process for analyzing and 
sensemaking. It allowed us to identify RI periods, which then constituted our new units of 
analysis for the exploration of the collective beliefs in the second stage of investigation. We 
identified the discontinuities at the frontiers between brackets based on the discourse, using 
word counts in a qualitative data analysis software. For example, between 2000 and 2001 the 
word “ethics” practically disappears and words such as “pension fund” and “pension 
manager” become salient in the data. This delineation based on content offers a stronger 
theoretical meaning than delineation based on coverage frequency, which can be influenced 
by economic cycles.    
 
Our approach is the first to provide empirical evidence of the evolution of RI over time, 
although several studies do trace the history of RI. We therefore verified the validity of our 
periods against periods proposed in literature (Giamporcaro & Gond, 2010), leading to similar 
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conclusions with one exception: the early religious period of RI, which takes place before any 
coverage of RI in the financial press, that is before any sign of mainstreaming.  
 
Media studies tend to concentrate on this type of quantitative content analysis that is relatively 
easy to measure (Fico, Lacy, & Riffe, 2008). But this type of analysis does not allow 
examining the symbolic meaning of the content, which leads us to our second stage of 
analysis, requiring a smaller sample.  
 
Stage 2: Identifying collective beliefs  
 
Sampling. To preserve the representativeness of the sample while reducing its size, we 
constructed theoretical two-week years, a recommended sampling method in media studies 
(Hijmans, Pleijter & Wester, 2003). Studies like those of Riffe, Lacy and Fico (1998) show 
that a qualitatively good newspaper sample should be based on at least twelve editions, where 
each day of the week is represented proportionally. For magazine articles in our data, such as 
articles from The Economist, we followed Wester (2006) according to whom an analysis of a 
weekly magazine can also be performed with a randomly selected issue per month, thus 
constructing a theoretical month, in some way similar to the process of theoretical weeks. We 
constructed our theoretical years after verifying that there was no seasonality in RI media 
coverage. The theoretical sub-sample is a selection of 89 articles distributed over the 18-year 
timeframe, a more manageable size for our second level of analysis which consists in 
identifying the RI collective beliefs.  
 
Analysis. The data analysis to identify collective beliefs was conducted in three main stages, 
a process which allowed us to move back and forth between the data and the emerging 
concepts to finally reach two abstract theoretical concepts. Our initial approach to code 
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development was prior-research driven (Boyatzis, 1998). We started the code list using 
literature on impediments to RI mainstreaming (Juravle and Lewis, 2008, Guyatt, 2006) based 
on the idea that these impediments are issues around which there is uncertainty and confusion. 
These are typically situations where investors will need to rely on collective beliefs to 
coordinate their decisions. To ensure rater-to-expert reliability (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 37), the 
prior-research driven codes were discussed directly with the reference author.  
 
We read a first selection of articles searching for salient representations of RI, in the light of 
our prior-research driven list, and then completed the list with codes based on the data. Once 
all codes were named and grouped in categories, we followed an iterative process between 
data and categories to finalize our coding tree. Intra-rater reliability was achieved by coding 
the same text twice on different days, and inter-rater reliability was achieved by comparing 
the coding of a sample of texts by two researchers.  
 
The second step involved axial coding (Corbin & Strauss, 2008), where we compared first-
order codes with one another, looking for patterns and themes to create second-order 
constructs. This process consisted in trial and error constructions of models, regrouping 
different codes based on their characteristics in order to develop a set of more abstract, 
theory-rich constructs. The axial coding was done by one researcher and put to test by the 
other researcher in a series of meetings. Through these iterative discussions, three second-
order constructs appeared to have useful explanatory power in terms of collective beliefs.  
 
We tested the validity of the second order constructs quantitatively for the fifth RI period. The 
frequency of each second order construct was set as a hypothesis, which we tested by 
duplicating our analysis on a new random sample of 20 articles selected from within the 
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universe of 1710 RI articles published during the fifth period (2005 to 2010). The results do 
not permit to affirm the existence of significant differences, with a confidence level of 1%.2 
 
Finally, in the third step we identified important dimensions from the sets of second-order 
constructs. For example, some codes like ethics or conflicts of logic appeared earlier in the 
history of RI. They were attempts to define and justify RI and they addressed more directly a 
critique, which was either implicit or explicit. Other codes, like engagement or innovation 
opportunity, appeared later in the history of RI, and were linked to success stories or 
challenges met by RI practitioners. We saw these as linked to the practice of RI and its 
challenges. Working in such a way through the relevant insights each construct provided, we 
consolidated the second level constructs into two broad theoretical dimensions: “justifying 
SRI” and “practicing RI.” The theoretical dimensions resulting from the data resonate with 
convention theory literature, with a focus on the multiplicity of equilibriums and institutional 
maintenance or change. Most importantly, they provided guidance to understand the financial 
actors’ collective beliefs around RI.  
 
A schematic overview of this process in figure 2 shows our first-order codes, second-order 
constructs, and derived theoretical dimensions which we use to study the mainstreaming 
process of RI among financial actors. 
--- Insert figure 2 here --- 
FINDINGS 
                                                          
2When a confirmatory analysis is performed using a chi-square test, it appears that a difference exists between 
the proportions of occurrences of the three second order constructs “How”, "Why" and "What". The confidence 
intervals constructed for the percentages of these occurrences indicate that the occurrences of “How” may be 
slightly over-estimated in the tested two-week-year sample, and the occurrences of “Why” may be slightly 
under-estimated, while the percentage of “What” falls within the constructed confidence intervals when the 
significance level was under 5%. Furthermore, with a 1% significance level, the data collected does not sanction 
the assertion of significant differences between the pi proportions of these three occurrences for Period 5 and the 
p*i estimations of the theoretical two-week-years. 
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A first finding is the five periods of RI. They are both a result for the first level of analysis, 
and a step in the methodology providing units of analysis for the second level of investigation. 
A second finding is the emerging collective beliefs that affect the mainstreaming of RI. The 
implication of those collective beliefs for mainstreaming and RI in general are addressed in 
the discussion section.  
 
RI periods 
We found five RI periods in our data, spanning the period between 1982 and 2010: the «civil 
rights» years (1982-1991), the «green niche» years (1992-1997), the «professionalization» 
years (1998-2000), the «SRI» years (2001-2004) and the “ESG” years (2005-2010).  
The first press article identified dated from 1982, which starts the first RI period. This 
corroborates Boxenbaum and Gond’s observation that “RI terminology first appeared in the 
New York Times in the late 1980s” (2013, p. 13). The last press articles, dating from the end 
of 2010, do not signal the end of the fifth period, as no discontinuity in the RI discourse in the 
press was identified despite the 2008 financial crisis. From our data we can say that the 
financial crisis did not provoke any change in the normative foundation of finance. However 
the impact of the crisis may be long term rather than short term. Therefore it would be 
interesting to further monitor this last RI period to determine when it gives place to a new RI 
period, with new characteristics in terms of discourse and salient representations of RI.  
--- Insert table 3 here --- 
Civil rights years. Media coverage during this period is overwhelmingly turned to South 
Africa, apartheid, black worker wages, and targeted campaigns against companies. The main 
RI strategy discussed is the divestment practice. In the data, finance is linked to ethics during 
this period. We label it the “civil rights” period (1982-1991) because of the focus on social 
issues.  




Green niche years. The second period (1992-1997) corresponds to the end of the apartheid 
coverage in the financial press. This period is characterized by low media coverage of RI. 
Still, there are a few references to niche financial initiatives, mostly environmentally oriented 
such as “green funds”. The concern for financial return linked to these ethical investments 
comes up for the first time in the discourse.  
 
Professionalization years. The third period (1998-2000) corresponds to the early 
professionalization years. Pension funds start to get a lot of attention in the financial press, 
along with the issue of their social responsibility. This is a transition period during which the 
word “responsibility” becomes the preferred terminology when discussing ethical 
investments.  
 
SRI years. In this fourth phase (2001-2004), the term “ethical” is abandoned, and the term 
“SRI” is introduced. The professionalization is increasing and “fund managers” and “fund 
management” become some of the most frequent words of the sample. With the boom in the 
coverage of pension funds, come the first discussions on materiality and regulation linked to 
RI.  
 
ESG years. The fifth period begins in 2005, when the focus of RI shifts to climate change. It 
is also characterized by the combination of RI and corporate governance, which were so far 
treated separately. We label this last period the ESG period because media coverage is 
characterized by a search for neutrality in its wording, away from any ethical shade. It is also 
during this period that the term ESG appeared. Although our sample ends in 2010, there is no 
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discontinuity so far that would allow closing the bracket. We therefore consider this period to 
be ongoing.   
 
Collective beliefs 
Our findings in terms of collective beliefs regarding RI (Table 4) consist of three second-
order constructs: defining or redefining what RI is, justifying the practice or non-practice of 
RI and clarifying how to approach RI, which we also refer to respectively as “what is RI”, 
“why do RI” and “how to do RI”. These collective beliefs are representations that emerged as 
focal points for individuals who, faced with uncertainty regarding the nature of RI, attempt to 
determine what the market will act upon. The collective beliefs for RI mainstreaming evolved 
over time around each of the three constructs. The evolution of each second order construct 
from period 1 to 5, illustrated in table 4, shows that the number of different collective beliefs 
around RI increases over time, meaning that constituents increasingly share common beliefs 
around this activity. 
--- Insert table 4 here --- 
The “civil rights” years (1985-1991) are dominated by the belief that RI is about ethics, and 
that business and ethics are separate concerns. However there is a belief that RI will grow in 
the future. The «green niche» years (1992-1997) emphasize the belief that RI does not lead to 
better (financial) performance than regular investment strategies, but that demand may grow. 
The «professionalization» years (1998-2000) highlight the complexity of RI, complexity 
which reappears in the «SRI» years (2001-2004). However this fourth period also shows an 
increasing number of collective beliefs around RI including the long term perspective of RI, 
the need for a more sophisticated approach to practice RI, the issue of materiality and the lack 
of good information to evaluate companies on ESG factors. The «ESG» years (2005-2010) 
bring in the notion of collaboration among actors and the importance of networks. The 
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discourse in this period highlights the importance of engaging with companies. In this last 
period we witness an evolution of the collective belief justifying the practice of RI: demand 
for RI is collectively believed to be growing, whereas in the previous periods demand for RI 
was seen as potentially growing in the future. Although RI is not yet mainstream, it has 
gained recognition among mainstream investors. 
 
The results also show that questions of definition and understanding disappear from the 
debate around RI, which has shifted from “what is RI” to “how to do RI”, highlighting the 
professionalization of the field, as illustrated in figure 3 and in the next two subsections.   
  
--- Insert figure 3 here --- 
Redefining what is RI 
 
Much of the RI discourse describes, defines or redefines responsible investment. This is 
particularly true in the early years of RI. We captured this discourse in the “Redefining what 
is RI” second order construct. 
Our data show that discussions around the ethics of RI play an important role in the first three 
periods. However, references to ethics are often located at the personal rather than collective 
level. In 2001, Sparkes raised the question: «whose ethics?» is RI referring to, because 
personal ethics may lead to many contradictions and tensions and hinder the process of 
mainstreaming. But the reference to personal ethics tends to disappear as from the 
professionalization years. Indeed, to mainstream RI, a higher level of abstraction may be 
necessary, which Donaldson and Dunfee (2002) refer to as hypernorms. Hypernorms are 
transcultural values that include fundamental concepts of rights and social good common to 
most major religions or countries.  
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With the professionalization of RI comes a need to define the conditions and methods of the 
institutional investors' work (DiMaggio et al., 1983). During this period, there is an attempt to 
obtain a certain normative control by standardizing professional norms. As a result, the 
predominant preoccupation relayed by the press in recent years has to do with information 
availability and standardization. The collective belief informs us that there is a lack of good 
data. And when information is available, it is often perceived as low quality and very 
dispersed, which does not allow benchmarking.  
 
“First comes greater standardisation of SRI performance measurement. The Social Investment Forum concluded: 
"With different definitions of SRI, market factors, cultural concerns and methodologies for collecting data, it is 
difficult to make controlled comparisons on a global scale." Source: 20070305FT 
 
The collective beliefs (re-)defining RI are characterized by ambiguity and differentiation over 
time: the data show a difficulty in being coherent. How can RI have values and bring financial 
return? Uncertainty around what is RI seems to be reduced during the green years: the belief 
during that period is that RI is green funds. The challenge of defining RI is not resolved for 
long, and resurges with the professionalization of the field. Funds cannot be “all things to all 
people” as one fund manager states (source: 20001026FT). This has practical implications 
when faced with investment decisions in grey areas and suggests a fragmentation of the RI 
market.  
 
During the green years, RI has a narrow definition, making it easier to circumscribe. After the 
green years, RI has a broader definition. The discussion on defining RI still goes on but on a 
different, more granular level. The RI press coverage of the last period highlights the short-
term focus of financial markets, for many reasons, including quarterly reporting and 
remuneration structure linked to short-term objectives. In contrast, RI is believed to have a 
long-term focus. Investors are left to interpret this salience in different ways. If RI is long-
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term, it does not fit the short-term focus of financial markets. But it also means RI can offer 
the long-term vision missing in financial markets. Finally, it means that any effect of RI 
(performance or materiality for example) would be visible in the long-term.  
 
To conclude, the collective beliefs for defining what RI is tell us about investments driven by 
personal values versus hypernorms, a heterogeneous market, and long-term horizon. In 
addition, RI is perceived as a boundary object, with few shared representations regarding what 
RI is, beyond the idea that it has varying definitions, interpretations, and practical 
applications.  
--- Insert table 5 here --- 
Justifying the (non-)practice of RI 
An important proportion of the discourse throughout all periods attempts to legitimize RI by 
building business cases and disseminating examples of RI success. Discussions on the link 
between RI and financial return, risk management arguments, professional legitimacy 
considerations, as well as the market demand for RI are themes that peak during the green 
niche years, then fluctuate without ever being the main issue. Interestingly, the discourse 
justifying the practice of RI and the discourse defining RI evolve in opposition. 
 
The question of financial return is key in all periods, and the data show that RI funds have not 
yet convinced in terms of their performance. Articles relay the academic and practitioner 
studies trying to prove the link of financial return, and a new consensus seems to form around 
the idea that it is complex to prove performance.  Our data for the ESG years affirm a positive 
link in 27% of cases and claims no financial underperformance for RI in another 27% of 
cases. The other 46% of the discourse states that there is a link but it is unclear, or notes that 
financial performance is key but that nothing more can be said about it. The collective belief 
Dumas & Louche, Collective beliefs for responsible investment; 2015 
22 
 
is that the link between RI and financial return is inconclusive, unclear and complex, 
reflecting a very similar debate in academic literature.  
 
Demand for RI is the second most important justification discourse for practicing RI. As for 
financial return, it is also a market driven discourse. In the first four periods, the collective 
belief is that there will be a demand for RI, and that it will grow. This demand is mostly 
believed to come from the base (private investors) and from unconventional institutional 
investors, such as faith based investors or NGOs. In the ESG years, the collective belief 
changes to there is a demand for SRI and it is growing.  
--- Insert table 6 here --- 
Clarifying how to practice RI 
A third type of collective belief clarifies how to practice RI. This discourse is practice-
oriented, addressing and discussing methods, regulations, RI initiatives, available resources 
and skills, accountability and materiality challenges. It steadily increases over time, and 
becomes the main topic in the last RI period.  
 
With the professionalization of RI comes a need to operationalize RI. Before the SRI years, 
our European data make very few mentions of professional associations or RI training, and 
there is no mention of RI organizations with enough visibility to organize and regroup 
mainstream investors (except for the ICCR). In contrast, in the last period the focus of many 
articles is on networks, with statements such as “I invite all institutional investors to consider 
becoming signatories to the PRI and join a global network of peers working to address these 
priorities” (source: 20090302FT.2) or “an increasing number of networks are sharing 
information, developing knowledge centres and finding new ways to communicate" (source: 
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20071102FT). The collective belief at this stage is that RI requires collaborative engagement : 
active investors working together as described in the following quote.  
“As active owners, investors should work with investee companies to ensure comprehensive and systematic 
disclosure of the information they need in order to make responsible investment decisions. Ensuring the disclosure 
of information on ESG and other issues will enhance investors' understanding of their underlying investments and 
avoid a repeat of recent mistakes.” Source: 20090302FT.2 
Another collective belief of “how to do RI” is that RI requires a more sophisticated approach. 
And until this approach is available (in terms of models, of materiality assessment, of analyst 
skills...), the coordination process based on this collective belief may lead mainstream funds 
to cautiously not engage in RI. Another result of the belief may be to push institutional 
investors to develop the tools and models currently missing for RI mainstreaming.  
 
--- Insert table 7 here --- 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper focuses on responsible investment in financial markets, informed by an alternative 
theory of market participants' decision making. Our analysis of the collective beliefs for 
responsible investment and of the evolution of these beliefs over time allows us to develop 
two categories of collective beliefs which influence the capacity of RI to become mainstream: 
justifying RI and practicing RI. We now elaborate on how our findings contribute to RI 
literature and extend existing accounts of collective beliefs.  
 
On the RI periods 
Our findings show that RI is regularly reformulated in new terms, translated to fit the 
collective beliefs of the time. Each of the five periods that we identified is characterized by its 
own terminology for RI, particularly the latter two in which the terms SRI and ESG were 
coined. Many publications give empirical evidence of RI translation in space (e.g. Sakuma & 
Louche, 2008, Lozano et al. 2006). Gond and Boxenbaum (2013) in particular followed the 
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steps of RI translation to fit geographical contexts, through glocalization. They distinguished 
the translation in meaning brought by glocalization from an “interpretative translation, which 
solely involves symbolic, rhetorical or discursive changes” (p.7). In this paper we illustrate a 
case of translation over time rather than through space, and more specifically a translation to 
fit collective beliefs. In fact, we add to their assertion that translation goes beyond discursive 
changes if it reflects the content of the new collective belief.  
 
On the collective beliefs of RI 
Our data illustrated that beliefs are not fixed but evolve over time: from “RI underperforms” 
to “RI performance is inconclusive”; from “RI demand will grow in the future” to “RI 
demand has now grown”. They thereby contribute to a changing landscape of RI.  Changes in 
the collective beliefs are difficult because of the behavioral and institutional resistance, but 
possible with a significant amount of coordination work.  
 
Convention theorists put forward a taxonomy of four types of changes in conventions: general 
collapse, external invasion, translation and collective agreement (Boyer and Orléan, 1992).  
The last three are of particular interest for considering the adaptation of conventions that 
investment professionals and their agents adhere to, since the industry is by nature 
conservative and mindful of fiduciary obligations to beneficiaries, making a slow process of 
change more likely than an abrupt abandonment or collapse of existing practices. The 
importance of legitimacy within the conventions framework also makes collective agreement, 
or collaboration, preferable to going alone (Guyatt, 2006). Our data show that these processes 
are taking place. Translation -- when the new convention integrates certain properties of the 
old one and is being reformulated in its proper terms-- occurred at each change of period, with 
the adoption of new discourse and new terminology. A large increase in articles discussing RI 
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has occurred since the SRI years in 2001, illustrating external invasion by institutional 
investors -- that is, the slow increase in the number of individuals adopting the new 
convention until it reaches a critical mass where all will convert to the new convention. Both 
processes hint to mainstreaming. However, the content of the collective beliefs shows little to 
no sign of collective agreement (i.e. the community as a whole may recognize the superiority 
of the new convention and trigger a coordinated change in collective behavior). Instead, the 
collective beliefs recognize the complexity of RI and the need for new tools and approaches. 
These collective beliefs tell us RI is still under construction. Our findings raise a question for 
future research: how do suboptimal solutions persist? There are indeed many cases in finance 
where sub-optimal solutions are long lasting, such as the efficient market hypothesis. 
 
This study follows the trajectory of multiple collective beliefs to finally identify two distinct 
categories of collective beliefs: “justifying RI” and “practicing RI”. Our data reveal that in the 
case of RI, collective beliefs “justifying RI” come first. It is not until these are largely 
resolved that collective beliefs about “practicing RI” dominate the discourse. These two types 
of collective beliefs emerging from our data reinforce an ongoing conversation about how 
institutions influence our thoughts and behavior. In addition, our findings illustrate how 
justification comes before action. This result may seem to contradict previous suggestions that 
the adoption of procedures comes logically prior to justification (Dequech, 2008). Although 
our data do not allow to explain this observation empirically, we would like to suggest that, in 
the case of RI mainstreaming, justification can come before action because both take place in 
the pre-existing context of financial markets. As a result, the objects, people and units of 
measurement according to which RI will be justified already exist – even if they are 
subsequently reinvented. In sum, the interaction between justifying and practicing plays a role 
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in legitimizing RI and further analysis should tell us more about the implications of 
justification before practice.  
 
On the implication of collective beliefs for RI mainstreaming  
From our findings, it appears that investors can no longer reasonably really ignore the topic of 
RI. Between 1982 and 2010, 3,462 financial press articles discussing RI were published in the 
media sources we sampled. However is it enough to claim that RI has moved from a niche 
activity to a mainstream practice? Some have argued that RI has become or is becoming 
mainstream (World Economic Forum and AccountAbility, 2005; Robeco and Booz & 
Company, 2008) while others are claiming that RI remains a niche (Entine, 2008).  
From the collective beliefs identified in the press, it seems difficult and premature to conclude 
that coordination has taken place among mainstream investors in terms of RI integration in 
mainstream finance. The nature of the collective beliefs remains confused and portrays a 
diffused perception of RI, but above all it highlights the numerous impediments for practicing 
RI. Those beliefs may well lead investors and analysts not to consider ESG factors. This 
cannot be described as an intentional strategy – this is not a case of dominant convention 
based on the belief that «no one uses ESG factors» – but rather as a result of the lack of clarity 
about RI. However, collective beliefs around RI are still evolving. As long as there is no 
collective belief encouraging the adoption of RI, sustainability remains a niche topic in 
financial markets. Although we cannot conclude on the existence of a collective belief leading 
to the integration of RI, we can say that the process of mainstreaming of RI is under way. 
 
Our findings support that as the discourse shifted from ethics to market logics (Mehrpouya, 
2011), RI matured and attained greater professionalization, but also became less critical of 
mainstream finance. The collective beliefs in the fifth, “ESG years”, period show no sign of 
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RI altering the financial order, but point rather to RI being modified by conventional finance 
as it is slowly co-opted by the financial community. Daudigeos and Valiorgue (2010) suggest 
similar results for the evolution of corporate responsibility strategies, which were absorbed by 
the corporate system as they matured. The financial market often seems impervious to critique 
and to change, as illustrated by the RI periods and collective beliefs which did not change 
after 2008. This special issue states that, “in spite of increasing concerns about environmental 
and closely related social and governance issues, there has not been a significant global shift 
towards greater sustainability”. If RI has the ambition to change mainstream finance’s supply 
and demand for sustainability, the collective beliefs of RI have important implications. These 
beliefs indeed influenced the value and desirability of RI, and they do not endorse it so far.  
 
RI in a theoretical context of market inefficiency  
Because we consider that value is created at the collective level, through coordination 
processes and collective beliefs, our study emphasizes the meso-level, which tends to be 
understudied in the field of RI. In this way, convention theory is very different from typical 
economic theory: we are not studying micro-level individual preferences, like economic 
theory that presents equilibriums resulting from personal utility functions. Similarly, the focus 
of behavioral finance stays on the micro-level – individual’s irrational beliefs – when it 
proposes to reconsider the rationality of actors and the efficient market hypothesis (Schleifer, 
2000, p.50.). But that framework creates new challenges, in terms of how to assess value. If 
there is no such thing as intrinsic value then value cannot be calculated by discounted cash-
flows. Furthermore, while these critiques are founded, they do not facilitate the case of RI 
mainstreaming because they do not fit in the financial language, which focuses on 
commensuration and mathematical models. If actors are irrational there is no 
commensuration, there is no benchmarking possible. This dilemma highlights the need for 
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alternative models to neo-classical theories that can be translated into a market logic 
(Orlitzky, 2013). 
 
With the convention theory lens, we also consider the RI market to be uncertain and 
confusing, thus not an efficient market. But we do not consider market players as irrational. 
Rather they take rational decisions based on their anticipations of collective beliefs. We built 
on Orléan’s questioning regarding financial market’s efficiency and regarding the fallacy of 
intrinsic value to better understand the collective beliefs around which actors coordinate. Our 
findings help us develop our proposition that the meso-level is the missing piece of a 
theoretical puzzle.  
 
Much effort has gone into demonstrating the value of responsible investment by measuring 
the link between RI and financial return. Those attempting to make the business case for RI, 
however, end up with inconclusive or unsatisfactory results. We suggest that these studies 
struggle to demonstrate the value of sustainability, because they approach value as an intrinsic 
notion instead of considering value as resulting from coordination processes. It is not that 
sustainability has little or no value; rather, its value is influenced by collective beliefs.  
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Table 1: Some illustrations of collective beliefs in literature 
Author Collective belief 
Brière (2006) Interest rates result from collective beliefs based on statements of the 
central bank 
Jemel-Fornetty, Louche, & 
Bourghelle (2011) 
Guyatt (2006) 
RI mainstreaming is slowed down by current collective beliefs 
Cheung, Chinn, & Marsh 
(2004) 
Foreign exchange spreads quoted by traders are based on collective belief 
due to strong market norm. 
Lordon (2000) Economic Value Added (EVA) formula spread by collective belief 
pushed by consultants 
Gillet & Szafarz (2004) Market efficiency hypothesis is a collective belief, not a reality  
Orléan (1999) “Asian miracle” collective belief dominated the valuation of South-East 
Asian countries during the mid-1990s, despite bad economic news 
 
Table 2: Method in two stages of sampling and analysis 
 Stage 1  Stage 2  
Objective  Periods of RI  RI collective beliefs  
Sampling  Full coverage  Theoretical years  
Sample size  3,462 articles  89 articles  
Analysis  Bracketing  Content analysis  
Unit of analysis  RI article  5 RI Periods  
Validation Prior research Duplication on new sample 
Result  5 RI periods  2 theoretical concepts  
 
Table 3: Five periods in the history of RI 
Periods   Salient discourse  
1982-1991:  Civil rights years Civil rights, South Africa  
1992-1997: Green niche years Niche ethical investment (green funds etc.). Limited press 
coverage  
1998-2000: Professionalization years Pension funds as key actors. More neutral wording. Transition 
period.  
2001-2004: SRI years Ethical discourse replaced by responsibility discourse 
2005-2010: ESG years RI linked to corporate governance; climate change as main issue 




Table 4: 3 types of collective beliefs for RI mainstreaming evolve over time 





(non-)practice of RI 
Clarifying how 
to approach RI 
period 1: Civil right years 
 RI is about ethics 
business and ethics are 
separate concerns 
RI demand will grow in 
the future 
NRQ* 
period 2: Green niche years 
 NRQ RI demand will grow in 
the future. 
RI returns underperform 
NRQ 
period 3: Professionalization years 
 RI is not all black or 
white 
RI’s financial 
performance is unclear  
NRQ 
period 4: SRI years 
 RI is long-term 
lack of information 
demand for RI exists materiality is unclear 
RI requires a more sophisticated 
approach 
period 5: ESG years 
 NRQ inconclusive financial 
performance 
growing demand for RI 
RI initiatives are multiplying 
RI networks are important  
Do RI through  engagement 
RI needs better data 
*NRQ = no relevant quote 
Table 5: Illustrative quotes of collective beliefs for RI: (re-)defining what is RI 
Civil rights 
years 
Green niche years Professionalization SRI years ESG years 
Personal values 
“Most ethical 
investors think the 
time is not yet 
right to relax their 
restrictions on 





“The deposits are used 
as loans for 
environmentally 
friendly projects in 
construction, farming 
and industry. You could 
say these depositors 
are idealistic," says Mr. 
Schwarz. "But there's 
satisfaction in their 
money cleaning up the 
air. " Source: 
19960306WSJ 
Hypernorms 
"When we first 
started out we 
focused on the 
negative side, 
excluding companies 
and trying to be all 
things to all people, 
but now we're moving 




“There are several 
debilitating 
limitations. One is 
the lack of a broad 








accelerate to find 
greater common 
ground and build 




Investors' ability to 
evaluate options and 
make informed 





 Personal values 
"I can think of nothing 
more ludicrous than 
investing in companies 
which make our future 
worse," says Tessa 
Tennant, head of 
global-care research at 
NPI. "Ethical investing 
isn't idealism, but 
Conflict of logics  
He offers a word of 
caution to those 
marketing such funds, 
however, not to rely 
too heavily on 
religious sentiment at 
the expense of 
fundamentals. […] 
Source: 19990305WSJ 
 Boundary object 
“When people say 
they want to invest 
ethically, we ask 
them what they 
mean," he explains. 
Source: 20090411FT 





Table 6: Illustrative quotes of collective beliefs for RI: justifying the (non-)practice of RI 
Civil rights years Green niche years Professionalization SRI years ESG years 
Lower return 
“There are some 
circumstances in which 
that duty [of getting 
the best possible 
return] has to give way 
to considerations 





agrees, of course. But 
interest in ethical 
investment funds 
appears to be 
growing, […] there 
are not enough of 




“In the U.K., money in 
funds tailored along 
religious or ethical lines, 
which tend to overlap in 
their investment 
philosophies, 
quadrupled in the past 
five years to GBP 2.2 
billion ($3.55 billion).” 
Source: 19990305WSJ  
Growing demand 
“The quest for fund 
managers willing - or, 
rather, able - to run 
pension fund money 
over the long term is 





"It's no good our 
saying, 'we don't 
perform so well but 
count on us to save 




“Seven ethical funds 
were in the bottom 
half of their sectors 
and four in the top 
half. The record is 
better for the one 
year period […] but 
in that period the 
average ethical fund 
has outperformed 





 “The novelty of 
Islamic funds has 
long ago worn off. 
Now, the issues are 









“This brings us to the 
much debated question 
of company profits/fund 
performances versus 
morality. Can ethical 
investment and 
shareholder value really 











Professionalization SRI years ESG years 
NRQ Uneven quality of 
research 
 “Some of continental 
Europe's 'green' 
investment funds […] 
claims could lose the 
confidence of 
investors because of 




“When the market 
first started it had 
absolutist notes and 
focused on exclusion. 
But now institutional 
investors are coming 
in on a more 
proactive, positive 
stance on behalf of 
their clients." Source: 
20001026FT 
Materiality, key criteria 
“The key litmus test will 
be whether performance 
on a given social or 
environmental issue 
provides useful insights 






Uneven quality of research 
“Another complication is this: how 
does one independently confirm 
proprietary analysis? More work is 
needed to develop objective, 
comprehensive and verifiable 
processes that enable investors to 
compare companies' ESG 
performances.” Source: 
20070305FT 
 Changing methods 
"There's a new trend 
in ethical investment, 
a pragmatism built on 
compromises. You 
take five hotel chains, 
for example, and pick 
the one which 
















Need for comparability 
“The Johannesburg 
Securities Exchange 
hopes to capitalise on 
both trends by launching 
a socially responsible 
investment (SRI) index. 
[…] It will be the world's 
third such index, and the 
developing world's first, 
with a launch expected 
early next year. Source: 
20031006FT 
 
Need for comparability 
“But data are often too vague, 
lacking order and integrity, and 
there is no agreement 
internationally over what a 
sustainability report should 
comprise." Source: 20101004FT.2 
Insufficient transparency 
“Screening is also hampered by the 
difficulties inherent in quantifying 
environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) issues. Data 
points may not be readily 
obtainable. Opaque corporate 
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disclosures may obstruct data 
gathering.”  Source: 20070305FT> 
Figure 1: The number of responsible investment articles per year increases cyclically. 
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